Judicial Control over the Sufficiency of the Evidence in Jury Trials by Long, Stanley B.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 4 Number 3 
8-1-1929 
Judicial Control over the Sufficiency of the Evidence in Jury Trials 
Stanley B. Long 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
Digital 
Commons 
Network 
Logo 
 Part of the Evidence Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Stanley B. Long, Judicial Control over the Sufficiency of the Evidence in Jury Trials, 4 Wash. L. Rev. 117 
(1929). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol4/iss3/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
JUDICIAL CONTROL OVER THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE
EVIDENCE IN JURY TRIALS
I. EALY METHODS OP CONTRTOLLING VERDICTS OP JURIES.
One has only to read the first few chapters of Thayer's Prelim-
mary Treatise on Evidence to realize that the history of trial by
jury, from its beginning until the present day, records a con-
tinuous struggle to prevent the rendition of unreasonable verdicts.
When the jury was really a body of witnesses summoned to try
the case on their own knowledge, rather than upon evidence pro-
duced in court, it was sought to control their verdict by attaint.
By this proceeding a new jury would be summoned to re-examine
the issue tried by the first jury, and if the second found that the
verdict of the first jury was false, the verdict would be reversed
and the first jury severely punished by infamy, forfeiture of their
property, and imprisonment." This crude method of controlling
the jury was employed in this country in colonial times until it
became obsolete because of the development of more effective de-
vices.2
But the severity of the punishment of common-law attaint ren-
dered the remedy unenforceable, and for a time the English judges
resorted to the practice of fining the jury as for misbehavior. But
this procedure, hardly more satisfactory than ordinary attaint, was
abandoned after Bwshel's Case,3 decided in 1670. There, according
to Thayer,
"The jurors who acquitted William Penn and William
Meade on a charge of taking part in an unlawful assem-
bly, etc., were fined and imprisoned. But on 'habeas cor-
pus' in the Common Pleas, they were discharged, and
Vaughan, C. J., pronounced the memorable opinion which
ended the fining of jurors for their verdicts, and vndi-
cated their character as judges of fact." '4
ITHAYER, EVIDENCE, 137-140; 1 HOLuSWORTH, HIST. OF ENG. LAW, 161,
SCOTT, "FUNDAMENTALS OF PROCEDURE IN AcTioIs AT LAW", 90; 3 BLACK-
STONE COm. 402.
'THAER, op. cit. 173; SCOTT, op. cit. 90. Attaint, although long obso-
lete, was not actually abolished in England until 1825. 1 HOLDSWORTH,
HIST. oF ENG. LAw., 161.
$VAUGHAN 135, 124 Eng. Reprints, 1006 (1670).
1 THAYER, Op. cit. 166.
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With "attaint" obsolete and the fines not feasible, the judges
after some hesitancy worked out a new method of control by grant-
mg new trials.' Beginning with Wood v. Gunston, decided in 1655,
the courts began the practice of granting new trials where the jury
had rendered a verdict in disregard of instructions, such action
being regarded as misconduct, or where the verdict was contrary to
the evidence.
Also the practice of demurring to the evidence was gaining favor
with litigants who desired to avoid the jury So long as the jury
could decide cases on their own knowledge and evidence produced
in court was merely to aid the jury in reaching a verdict this system
was of little or no value except m actions founded on written docu-
ments of which "profert" could be demanded.7  But the notion
was becoming recognized that juries should decide cases solely on
the basis of evidence produced in court, and the demurrer to the
evidence came to be an effective method of withdrawing the case
from the jury on the theory that by admitting the facts there re-
mained only a question of law to be decided.8
The demurrer to the evidence, as an effective device, received its
mortal blow in 1794 in the case of Gibson v. Hunter,9 which held
5 THAYErI, op. cit. 166. And see next footnote. As late as 1648, in Slade's
Case, Style 138, on motion that judgment might be arrested and a new
trial granted because the verdict passed against the opinion of the trial
judge, the court held that the judgment ought not to be stayed "for it was
too arbitrary for them (the judges) to do it, and you may have your
attaint against the jury and there is no other remedy in law for you; but
it were good to advise the party to suffer a new trial for better satis-
faction."
0 Style 466. 82 Eng. Reprints, 867. In an anonymous case, 1 Keb. 864
(1665) "the court of King's Bench, on certificate of a judge that the verdict
was given contrary to the evidence, but ordered the sheriff should return
a good jury in the new trial. Hyde, Chief Justice, conceived jurors ought
to be fined if they would go against hare and direction, take bit in mouth
and go headstrong against the court; and said that by the grace of God
he would have it tried, seeing the attaint is now fruitless." The remedy
of granting a new trial did not become well established until somewhat
later. See Martyn v. Jackson, 3 Keb. 398 (1675) where it is said that
"juries are wilful enough, and denying new trial here will but send parties
into the chancery yet new trial was denied." In Ash v. Ash, Comb. 357
(1697) Holt, C. J., denied the "despotic power" of the jury and granted a
new trial because of excessive damages. For an application to chancery
see Mill v. Wharton, 2 Vern. 378 (1700)
Midielton v. Baker Cro. Eliz. 752; 78 Eng. Rep. 983 (1600).
'See Smith dem. Dormer v. Packhurst, Andrews 315 (1738) Stephens
v. White, (Va. 1796) 2 Wash. 203.
211 BLACKSTONE, 187 126 Eng. Rep. 499. See discussion by THAYER,
op. cit. 235.
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that where the evidence was circumstantial, the demurrant must
expressly admit every fact which the evidence tended to prove; in
other words, the worst possible finding winch the jury could return
against the demurrant. After Gibson v. Hunter, it was safer for a
litigant to take ins chances with -the jury where the evidence was
circumstantial. Furthermore, one could only demur to ins oppon-
ent's evidence," and by so doing the demurrant forfeited the oppor-
tunity of putting in his own evidence and having the jury decide the
issue. Moreover, if the demurrer was not well founded, judgment
was rendered against the demurrant. Hence, after Gibson v. Hun-
ter demurrers to the evidence fell largely into disuse, and motions
to direct a verdict or to enter a nonsuit took their place, upon the
denial of which the moving party was still entitled to have the case
submitted to the jury " The courts were inclined to favor the non-
suit over the directed verdict, because a nonsuit did not prevent
the bringing of another action, whereas a dikected verdict did.
Once the idea was accepted that juries must decide issues of fact
upon the basis of evidence produced in open court, it followed that
where the party bearing the burden of proof had produced no evi-
dence, the jury could not decide in ins favor. So the practice of
directing a verdict began with cases where the proponent 2 had
offered no proof. Probably the first case of note, where the ver-
dict was directed on tins ground was Syderbottom v, Smith,3
decided in 1725. And the process was completed in 1824 when it
was finally ruled in Bulceley v. Butler,14 that the refusal to direct
a verdict might be reviewed on bill of exceptions.
The two weapons that have thus come down to us for con-
trolling the verdicts of juries with respect to the sufficiency of
the evidence are (a) granting of a new trial, and (b) taking the
case from the jury entirely, either before verdict, on motion for
nonsuit, directed verdict, or its statutory compamon, challenge
S'Woo dgates Acmzn. v. Threlkeld, (Ky. 1814) 3 Bibb. 527.
G. H. & S. A. Ry v. Templeton, 87 Tex. 42, 26 S. W 1066 (1894) see
also, Slocur v. N. Y. -Ife Ins. Co., 228 U. S. 364, 33 Sup .Ct. 523 (1913).
"The advantages over the demurrer to the evidence of the modern prac-
tice of moving for a nonsuit, a dismissal or a directed verdict, is that if
the motion is denied, the moving party may still be entitled to have the
issues submitted to the jury." Eberstadt v. State, 92 Tex. 94, 45 S. W 1007
(1898). See also, Browder v. Phknney, 30 Wash. 74 (1902).
12 Used to designate the party bearing the burden of going forward
with the evidence.
'1 SSTRNGE 649, 93 Eng. Rep. 759.
1
'2 B. & C. 434 (1824).
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to the legal sufficiency of the evidence, 15 or, after verdict, on mo-
tion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
II. NEW TRIALS.
In an early English case 6 decided in 1757, Lord Mansfield, m
commenting upon the power of the courts to grant new trials, re-
marked (p. 393)
"Trials by jury, in civil cases, could not subsist now
without a power somewhere to grant new trials. But
a general verdict can only be set aside by a new trial,
which is no more than having the cause more deliberately
considered by another jury, when there is a reasonable
doubt, or perhaps a certainty, that justice has not been
done. '
Ever since the power to grant new trials became recognized, it
has been more generously exercised than the power to take the
case from the jury entirely, for the reason that the consequences
are not so severe. A directed verdict, or a ruling sustaining a chal-
lenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, constitutes a decision on
the merits, 7 and, unless reversed on appeal, ends the litigation.
Even a nonsuit, though not a bar to another action, ends the par-
ticular action and requires the bringing of a new one. On the
other hand, setting aside the verdict and granting a new trial,
continues the litigation and submits the cause to another jury
Furthermore, a verdict may be set aside on grounds other than
that it is against the weight of the evidence. Misconduct of the
prevailing party or jury, excessive or inadequate damages given
under the influence of passion or prejudice, and newly discovered
evidence, or accident or surprise are familiar examples of grounds
warranting a new trial.'"
III. TAKING THE CASE FROM THE JURY.
a. The Scintilla Rule.
It is now well established that when the evidence is insufficient
"1 Rem. Comp. Stat. sec. 340, amended Laws of Wash. 1929, Chap. 89,
sec. 2. See notes of Revision Committee printed on House Bill No. 26 as
to the purposes of the amendment.
"0Bright v. Eynon, 1 Burr. 390, 97 Rep. 365.
I"McKim v. Porter 60 Wash. 270, 110 Pac. 1073 (1910).
I, Rem. Comp. Stat., sec. 399.
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to warrant any verdict, the case may be taken from the jury
entirely, either before verdict, on motion for a nonsuit, or a directed
verdict, or a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, or, after
verdict, on motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or,
even after disagreement of the jury, on motion for judgment not-
withstanding the failure of the jury to agree upon a verdict.19
The question then arises. When is the evidence insufficient, so
as to permit the case to be taken from the jury9
At first the rule was that if the proponent had offered any evi-
dence, the court could not direct a verdict. In the case of Company
of Carpenters v. Hayward,2 0 decided in 1780, we find the follow-
img statement by Buller, J. (p. 375)
"Whether there be any evidence, is a question for the
judge, whether sufficient evidence, is for the jury "
Even in 1856, the Supreme Court of the United States in
Richardson v. City of Boston21 reversed a judgment based on a
directed verdict where there was some evidence. Grier, J., said
(p. 268)
"As it is the duty of the jury to decide the facts, suffi-
ciency of evidence to prove those facts must necessarily
be within their province."
Speaking of a directed verdict, the Justice continued.
"An instruction like this is imperative on a jury, it
has taken the place in practice, of a demurrer to the evi-
dence, and must be governed by the same rules. If there
be no evidence whatever to prove the averments in the
declaration, it is the duty of the court to give such per-
emptory instruction. But if there be some evidence, tend-
ing to support the averment, its value must be submitted
to the jury with proper instruction from the court."
However, it is evident that the rule that a "scintilla" of evidence
made a case for the jury was soon abandoned. In Toomey v. Lon-
don Ry. Co.,22 decided in 1857, Williams, J., said
"It is not enough that there was some evidence, for
2'Fobes Supply Go. v. Kendrick, 88 Wash. 284, 152 Pac. 1028 (1915).
01 Doug. 374, 93 Rep. 759.
"19 How. 263.
3 C. B. (ns.) 146, 140 Rep. 694.
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every person who has had any experience in courts of
justice knows well that a case of this sort against a rail-
way company could only be submitted to a jury with one
result. A scintilla of evidence or a mere surmise that
there might have been negligence on the part of the de-
fendants, clearly would not justify the judge in leaving
the case to the jury, there must be evidence upon which
they might reasonably and properly conclude that there
was negligence."
In the same case, Willes, J., remarked that in order to make a
case for the jury (p. 150),
"It was incumbent on the plaintiff to prove some fact
which was more consistent with negligence than with the
absence of it."
The Supreme Court of the United States, it appears, soon fol-
lowed the lead of the English court. For in the case of Improve-
ment Co. v. Munson,23 decided in 1872, we find Mr. Justice Clif-
ford declaring (p. 448)
"Nor are judges any longer required to submit a ques-
tion to the jury merely because some evidence has been
introduced by the party bearing the burden of proof, un-
less the evidence be of such a character that it would war
rant the jury in finding a verdict in favor of that
party "
Formerly, it was held that if there was what was called
a scintilla of evidence in support of a case, the judge was
bound to leave it to the jury, but more recent decisions of
high authority have established a more reasonable rule
that in every case, before the evidence is left to the jury,
there is a preliminary question for the judge, not whether
there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any
evidence upon which a jury can properly proceed to find
a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the bur-
den of proof is imposed. ' 24
The same advance was made in the state courts. In 1874, m the
case of Baidic v. B. R. Co.,2 5 the New York Court of Appeals,
speaking through Allen, J., said (p. 366)
S14 Wall. 442. In Small Co. v. Lamborn Co., 267 U. S. 248, (1925) the
rule was recently reiterated.
"Citing among others the English case of Toomey v. R. 1?., supra,
note 22.
2559 N. Y. 356 (1874).
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"It is not enough to authorize the submission of a ques-
tion, as one of fact to a jury, that there is some evidence,
a scintilla of evidence, or a mere surmise that there may
have been negligence on the part of the defendants would
not justify the judge in leaving the case to the jury (per
Toomey v. R. R. Co., supra) In another case it was
held that a judge will not be justified in leaving the case
to the jury when the plaintiff's evidence is equally con-
sistent with the absence as with the existence of negli-
gence in the defendant. In such a case the party affirm-
ing negligence has altogether failed to establish it, and
Earle, C. J., says, 'that is a rule which ought never be
lost sight of.' (Cotton v. Wood, 8 C. B. (N.S.) 528.)"
In Hyatt v. Johnson,26 decided in 1879, Justice Sharret of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, said (p. 200)
"Since the 'scintilla' doctrine has been exploded, both
in England and in this country, the preliminary question
of law for the court is not whether there is literally no
evidence or a mere scintilla, but whether there is any that
ought reasonably to satisfy the jury that the fact sought
to be proved is established."
In adhering to the same rule, the Supreme Court of the state
of Washington, in the case of McCowan v. Northwestern Siberian
Co.,27 decided in 1906, speaking through Judge Fullerton said.
"Appellant's counsel quotes from the decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States, and from others of
this state following that court, the rule that the question
before the court is not whether there is literally no evi-
dence on the question at issue, but whether there is any
upon which the jury can properly proceed to find a ver-
dict for the party producing it the party on whom the
burden of proof is imposed, and he argues further that
while in this case there may be a scintilla of evidence in
favor of the respondent, there is no substantial evidence
sustaining his side of the controversy, and hence no suffi-
cient evidence to sustain a verdict. The rule of law here
announced by the appellant must be conceded. Unques-
tionably, if it be true that there was no more than a
scintilla of evidence in favor of the respondent or,-
-91 Pa. St. 196 (1879).
41 Wash. 675, 84 Pac. 614. See also to the same effect, Jones iv. Harrs,
122 Wash. 69, 210 Pac. 22 (1922) Adams v. Anderson Lumber Co., 124
Wash. 356, 214 Pac. 835 (1923) Kelly v. Drumheler 50 Wash. Dec. 104,
272 Pac. 731.
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to state the rule in another form-no substantial evidence
in his favor, the judgment must be set aside."
And further
"The question, therefore, is, was there any substan-
tial evidence upon which the judgment can be sus-
tained."
Thus evolved the modern rule that a case cannot be taken from
the jury, if on the evidence adduced, the jury could reasonably
declare the facts to be proved, necessary to establish his case.
b. Power of the Trial Court With Respect to the Sufficiency
of the Evidence.
In passing on an appropriate motion to take the case from
the jury, the court considers whether there is any evidence from
which the jury may reasonably infer the ultimate or operative
facts necessary to establish the proponent's case. If there is such
evidence, it is reversible error to take the case from the jury, and
it makes no difference that there is other evidence in sharp con-
flict with that which tends to establish the proponent's case. Once
the proponent has established a prima facie case, his right to have
the jury pass upon the question cannot be destroyed by conflicting
or rebutting evidence, no matter how preponderating.
-2 8
On the other hand, a judge, in passing upon a motion to set aside
a verdict as against the weight of the evidence and to grant a new
trial, can not only consider whether there was any evidence
which, if believed by the jury would sustain the verdict, but he
can take into consideration the opposing evidence. In other words,
he can weigh the evidence and if he feels that the jury had acted
unreasonably in believing proponent's evidence, in view of the
more preponderating evidence on the other side, he can set aside
the verdict and grant a new trial.29
That this distinction has been recognized by the Supreme Court
of this state is no longer a matter of doubt, for in the case of
Clark v. Great Northern R. R. Co.2 0 it was said per curiam, on
page 540
"Dublin, Wicklow & Wexford Ry. Co. v. Slattery, 3 A. C. 1155 (1878)
Accord: O'Conner v. Force, 58 Wash. 217, 109 Pac. 1014 (1910) and see
note 44.
"Jones v. Spencer 77 L. T. R. 536 (1898).
3* 37 Wash. 537, 79 Pac. 1108, 2 Ann. Cas. 760 (1905)-see also Tacoma v.
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"Our statute provides (Rem. Comp. Stat., sec. 399) that
a new trial may be granted, among other grounds, for in-
sufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict, and this
power must be exercised by the trial court if at all. These
courts should take due care not to invade the legitimate
province of the jury, but if after giving full considera-
tion to the testimony in light of the verdict, the trial
judge is still satisfied that the verdict is against the
weight of the evidence, and that substantial justice has
not been done between the parties, it is his duty to set
the verdict aside."
It has been stated that the failure to recognize the distinction
has often resulted in a nnsmterpretation of the statement com-
monly found in opinions dealing with directed verdicts, that a
court "may direct where the evidence is of such a conclusive char-
acter that the court in the exercise of its sound discretion would
be compelled to set aside a verdict rendered in opposition to it. " 1
Undoubtedly, these statements (though the contention is made that
they are based on no more than a scintilla of evidence), have been
interpreted, and reasonably so, to mean that if the court could set
a verdict aside, then it could direct a contrary verdict in the first
instance. Or since the court could weigh the evidence32 for the
purpose of setting it aside, then under like conditions it could
direct a verdict on the weight of the evidence.
In MePeck v. Central Vt. R. R. Co." the court said (p. 591)
"As was said by us in DeLorta v. Whitney, 11 C. C. A.
355, 361, 63 Fed. 611, 'When a verdict in one direction
ought to be set aside as against the weight of the evi-
dence, then, under the rule as it is now understood, the
court ought to direct a verdict in the other direction.'
The time has gone by when the federal courts sit at their
own loss of time, and at the expense of the parties to take
verdicts which they can foresee ought to not be taken."
On the other hand, the Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit,
in Mount Adams R. R. Co. v. Lowery" clearly pointed out, in sup-
Tacoma L-ght and W Co., 16 Wash. 288, 47 Pac. 738 (1897), Kincasd v.
Walla Walla 7alley Tract Go., 57 Wash. 334, 106 Pac. 918 (1910), In Re
Renton, 61 Wash. 330, 112 P. 348 (1910)
nFor such statements see-Delaware L. & W RT. Co. v. Converse, 139
U. S. 469, 11 Sup. Ct. 569 (1890), Pleasants v. Flant, 89 U. S. 116 (1875).
" Note 30, supra.
-C. C. A. 79 Fed. 590 (1897).
8474 Fed. 463 (1896).
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port of the view taken by the Supreme Court of Washington
(later to be more fully examined) a distinction between the power
to direct a verdict and the power to set aside a verdict. The
question before the court was whether a verdict should have
been directed, Justice Lurton said (p. 470)
"Neither is it the proper standard to settle for a per-
emptory instruction that the court, after weighing the
evidence in the case, would, upon a motion for a new trial,
set aside the verdict. The court may and often should set
aside a verdict when clearly against the weight of the
evidence, when it would not be justified in directing a
verdict."
There is some doubt as to which of the two theories above set
forth the weight of authority can be said to support, although the
former is usually said to be the federal rule.3 5 A leading case,
and one most vigorously urged in support of the distinction as
above pointed out, is the well-known case of McDonald v. Metro-
politan Street Ry. Co.,36 which was decided in 1901. In that case
the plaintiff's evidence established a case which, undisputed, was
sufficient to warrant a verdict in her favor. But the Appellate
Division said that at the close of the defendant's evidence the
plaintiff's case had been so far overcome that a verdict in her
favor would have been set aside as against the weight of the evi-
dence. Under these conditions of proof, that court then held that
the trial court might have properly submitted the case to the jury
if it had seen fit, but that it was not required to do so as the
verdict might have been set aside. Consequently a judgment for
defendant based upon a directed verdict was affirmed." The
Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, however, and ordered a
new trial. Judge Martin, speaking for the court, said (p. 69)
"While in many cases, even when the evidence is suffi-
cient to sustain it, a verdict may be properly set aside and
a new trial ordered, yet, that in every such case the trial
35 26 R. C. L. p. 1068, where many authorities are collected, 38 Cyc.
1571. For an excellent review of the early cases on this phase, see: 22
COLUMBIA LAW REV. 256. The Supreme Court of the United States appears
to support the first view- Pleasants v. Flant, 22 Wall. 116-120 (1875) see
also note 23, supra. But, as appears from the quotations above from the
circuit courts of appeals of two different circuits, the federal courts are
not in harmony as to the scope of the rule laid down by the Supreme
Court. In the latest case, Small Co. v. Lamborn Co., 267 U. S. 248 (1925)
the Supreme Court, while reiterating the so-called fderal rule on directing
verdicts where a verdict would be set aside, links it with the "scintilla"
rule.
2167 N. Y. 66, 60 N. E. 282.
3 46 App. Div 143, 61 N. Y. Supp. 817 (1899)
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court may wherever it sees fit, direct a verdict and thus
forever conclude the parties, has no basis in the law,
which confides to juries, and not to courts the determina-
tion of facts in this class of cases.
"We think that it cannot be correctly said in any case
where the right of trial by jury exists, and the evidence
presents an actual issue of fact, that a court may prop-
erly direct a verdict.
"The credibility of witnesses, the effect and weight of
conflicting and contradictory testimony, are all questions
of fact and not questions of law. If there is no evi-
dence to sustain an opposite verdict, a trial court is jus-
tified in directing one, not because it would have authority
to set aside an opposite one, but because there was an actual
defect in the proof, and hence as a matter of law the
party was not entitled to recover."
In Weir v. Seattle Electric Co.,8 a case decided by the Supreme
Court of this state in 1906, the court therein justified the distinc-
tion between the limited power to direct a verdict and the broader
power of setting a verdict aside on the basis of their respective
consequences. In the latter instance there is a retrial, while in the
former the judgment is final.
Following the case of McDonald v. Metropolitan St. B. B. Co.,39
Judge Rudki in the aforesaid case of Weqr v.,Seattle Electrc
0o.0 said (p. 661)
"The respondent further contends that the prepon-
derance of the testimony was so strongly in its favor that
it would have been the duty of the court to set aside a ver-
dict in favor of appellant, had one been found, or re-
turned, and that the court was therefore justified in
directing a verdict in the first instance. Judging from
the number of witnesses alone, and that is practically the
only guide we have, it will readily be conceded that a
preponderance of the testimony was with the respondent,
but that alone will not justify the action of the trial
court [in directing a verdict in their favor]. Doubtless
in some jurisdictions the rule prevails that, if 'the court
would set aside a verdict in favor of one of the parties,
as against the evidence, it may direct a judgment in favor
of the adverse party, but that rule does not obtain in this
state. We have uniformly held that the granting of a
new trial rests in the discretion of the trial court, and if
41 Wash. 657, 84 Pac. 597.
"Note 36, supra.
"Note 38, supra. Accord: Dames v. Rose-Marshal Coal Co., 74 Wash.
565, 134 Pac. 180 (1913).
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we concede to the trial courts the same power or discre-
tion in directing judgments, the right of trial by jury
will be practically abrogated."
The court in the same case further remarked on page 662
"The power of the Superior Court to direct a judg-
ment is practically commensurate with its power to direct
a nonsuit. The only substantial difference between the
two judgments is that the former is 'res adjudicata,'
while the latter is not unless based on some affirmative
finding. Cases may arise in which a plaintiff's prima
facie case is so fully explained and controverted as to
have no substantial conflict in the testimony, but ordi-
narily testimony which is sufficient to carry it to the jury
at the close of the testimony 41
In the case of Messir v. McLea'n,42 decided in 1908, which was
an action to recover for personal injuries received by plaintiff
while in defendant's employ, alleged to hav6 been caused by the
defendant's negligence, issue was taken on the allegations of neg-
ligence and the defense of contributory negligence. Trial was
entered upon before the court and jury At the close of the
plaintiff's case a challenge was interposed to the sufficiency of
the evidence, which was overruled. The jury returned a verdict
in favor of the plaintiff, and the court after overruling a motion
for a new trial, granted a motion for a directed judgment not-
withstanding the verdict. On appeal taken from the judgment so
entered, Judge Fullerton, speaking for the court, said (p. 142)
"In this case the evidence on the part of the appellant
(plaintiff) tended to show that this duty (providing a
safe place in which to work) had not been performed, and
that the appellant had received an injury as the result
of negligence on the part of the respondent, tended to
show that the place complained of as unsafe was reason-
ably safe, and that the injury was the result of the
appellant's own negligence. But this left a question
for the jury, not the judge, to determine, and it was there-
fore error on the part of the court to direct the verdict
(complained of) Of course, if the judge was of the opin-
ion that the evidence preponderated in favor of the re-
spondent, it was his province to grant a new trial so that
See; Morris v. Warwick, 42 Wash. 480, 85 Pac. 42, 7 Ann. Cas. 687
(1906) to the effect that the trial judge has no power to discharge the
jury and render judgment for the defendant because he thought a new
trial would be necessary if any other verdict was returned, vnless there is
no legal testimony to sustain a verdict for the plaintiff.
12 51 Wash. 140, 98 Pac. 106.
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the question of fact might be submitted to another jury,
but it was not his province for any such reason to take the
question from the jury and determine it as a finality him-
self."
The rule forbidding the court to direct a verdict on the weight
of the evidence, was well stated in O'Connor v. Force." Judge
Fullerton, again speaking for the court, said.
"We are still satisfied that the appellants (plaintiffs)
by their evidence made a 'prina facie' case. This being
so, the trial judge should not have denied them the right
of trial by jury on mere contradictory evidence, no mat-
ter what his own conclusions may have been as to the
weight of the evidence. If in his belief the evidence
against the plaintiff was so far overwhelming as to cause
him to feel that the verdict of the jury amounted to a mis-
carriage of justice, it was his province to set the ver-
dict aside and submit the question to a second jury, but
he had no right to take the burden of deciding the facts
upon himself. The right of trial by jury is a constitu-
tional right, and is not to be denied a litigant who insists
upon it and complies with the statutes relating thereto."
Again Judge Fullerton, in the later case of Hendrickson v.
Smith," decided in 1920, declared (p. 88)
"Appellants argue that the evidence is so overwhelm-
ing on their side as to require the court either to direct
a verdict in their favor or to enter a judgment for them
against the adverse verdict of the jury By an express
provision of the constitution of the state, and by the gen-
eral laws, a litigant has the absolute right to have dis-
puted questions of fact submitted to the determination of
a jury " " and it is within the power of the trial
court to set aside a verdict which he is convinced is con-
trary to the evidence and submit the disputed question to
another jury But this is the limit of the power. Judges
cannot, without violating the fundamental law, substitute
their opinions on a disputed question of fact, for the opin-
ions of juries, and enter judgment contrary to the verdict
of such juries. So here, since there was a substantial con-
flict in the evidence on a matter material to the liquiry,
the court did not err in refusing to direct for the de-
fendants."
"3 58 Wash. 217, 109 Pac. 1014 (1910).
"Ill Wash. 82, 189 Pac. 550.
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This distinction would seem to be further justified by examin-
ing and contrasting the statutes of this state, relating to the
granting of new trials, 45 and the withdrawing of cases from the
jury following a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence,'4
and the resulting direction of the verdict by the court. And the
1929 amendment 47 expressly provides that m passing on chal-
lenges to the sufficiency of the evidence the court shall not pass
on disputed questions of fact.
The case of Morris v. Warwick4 was an action for the aliena-
tion of the affections of the plaintiff's wife. At the close of the
plaintiff's testimony defendant's motion for a nonsuit was denied,
and at the close of the case the, defendant challenged the legal
sufficiency of the testimony and also moved the court for an m-
structed verdict. The court thereupon discharged the jury and
entered judgment, saying to the jury, in effect, that "it was the
court's duty to discharge them and render a verdict in accord-
ance with the court's opinion, inasmuch as the court m view of
the testimony would be compelled to set aside a verdict for the
plaintiff should the jury return one." The Supreme Court upon
appeal, reversing the judgment entered below in favor of the
defendant, said
it Bal. Code, see. 5071, sub. div 7 (Rem. Comp.
Stat., see. 399, sub. div 7) especially makes insufficiency
of the evidence to justify a verdict a ground for granting
a new trial. But it will be observed that it does not
authorize the court to take the case from the jury and
make a final determination of the issue itself, but that,
acting upon the supposition that substantial justice has
not been done by reason of some mistake or inadvertence
of the jury, simply gives parties another trial. As to how
often the court would be justified in granting a new trial
on the same testimony in the same case is a question to
be determined by the appellate court in passing upon the
proper exercise of such discretion on the part of the trial
court. Under this theory of law, however, the ultimate
decision upon the question of fact involved is the province
of the jury Bal. Code, sec. 4994 (Rem. Comp. Stat., see.
340) This section, it will be observed, deals alone with
45 Rem. Comp. Stat. Vol. 1, sec. 399, sub. div. 7. "The former verdict
or other decision may be vacated and a new trial granted, on the motion
of the party aggrieved, for any of the following causes, materially affect-
ing the substantial rights of such party" Sub. div. 7 "Insufficiency of
the evidence to justify the verdict or the decision, or that it is against the
law"
"See note 15, &upra.
' See note 15, supra.
"See note 41, supra.
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the legal sufficiency of the evidence, not taking into ac-
count at all its probative sufficiency That is to say, if
the evidence offered, if admitted to be true, is not legally
sufficient to sustain a verdict, there is nothing for the
jury to pass upon, and it becomes the duty of the trial
court to discharge the jury and render the judgment
which the law prescribes.41
And in the later case of Odalowch v. Wesr,50 decided m 1924,
the Supreme Court reversed a judgment rendered in favor of
defendant on a verdict directed by the lower court in the following
language:
"I believe it is my plain duty here to grant tins motion
(to direct verdict) in consideration of all the evidence of
the case. If the jury were to consider this evidence and
return a verdict in favor of plaintiff, it would be obliged
to set it aside on the grounds that the testimony is so
overwhelming against plaintiff that the verdict could not
be based on evidence."
In cons~dering the statement of the trial court above quoted
the Supreme Court said (p. 58)
"There was a conflict in the evidence. The trial court in
considering the testimony was satisfied beyond a reason-
able doubt that the driver of the machine was negligent.
Tins, however, would be ground sufficient for the
granting of a new trial, but would in no sense be suffi-
cient ground for directing a verdict. Granting a new
trial is within the discretion of the trial court. Sustain-
mg a motion for an instructed verdict is not discretion-
ary i 1 The former puts an end to the litigation but allows
another trial of the issues and facts in controversy, while
the latter finally determines the rights of the parties."
Perhaps the most illustrative case in tins state demonstrating
the effect and operation of our statute providing for a challenge
to the sufficiency of the evidence and its relation to the province of
the trial court in directing a verdict is that of Spokane & Idaho Lbr
"The Supreme Court of Washington has repeatedly held without ex-
ception that judgments granted under this section are judgments upon
the merits, and become therefore as to later trials upon the same facts
"res adjudicata." Spokane & Idaho Lbr Co. v. Loy, 21 Wash. 510, 58 Pac.
672 (1899) Bartlett v. seehorn, 25 Wash. 261, 65 Pac. 185 (1901) Wezr
v. Seattle Elec., note 38, supra, Sweeny v. Waterhouse & Co., 43 Wash. 61,
86 Pac. 46 (1906), Mcadure v. Bryant Lbr and, Shingle Co., 53 Wash. 425,
102 Pac. 237 (1909).
132 Wash. 57, 231 Pac. 170.
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Co. v. Loy, 2 decided in 1899. That case presented an action by
the respondent against the principal and his sureties on a statutory
bond given by a contractor (Loy), who agreed to construct a pub-
lic bridge in and for the city of Spokane, to recover a balance
alleged to be due for lumber sold and delivered to such contrac-
tor. It was shown at the trial that the contractor, Loy, assigned
his contract with the city, and all his rights and interest thereto,
to one Boyd, and that the sureties in the bond, other than the
appellants here, consented to such assignment, and agreed in writ-
ing to continue bound thereby The presumption was thus raised
that the appellants did not consent to such assignment, and, if they
did not, it is clear that they were not liable to the respondent for
the value of any lumber furnished to the assignee. It further
appeared in proof that the respondent furnished some lumber to
Boyd after the assignment, and after Loy had ceased to work upon
the bridge or direct the same. There was also evidence tending
to show that a considerable amount of lumber was furnished by the
respondent to Loy himself, while in charge of the construction
of the bridge, and it would therefore seem that there was before
the court the question of liability of the appellant, Loy, and the
extent thereof. Under these facts appellant, Loy, moved for judg-
ment, the denial of which was assigned as error. The trial court,
however, took the case from the jury under authority of Rem.
Comp. Stat., see 340 (see note 46 supra) and directed judgment
for the plaintiff, which action of the court is also assigned as error.
The appellate court in reversing the judgment, for error committed
by the trial court in taking the case from the jury, said
"No doubt the trial court based its action on Rem. and
Bal. Code, sec. 4994 (Rem. 340), which is as follows (Rem.
340 quoted, note 46, supra) We do not think it was the
intention of the legislature in enacting this statute to em-
power the superior courts of this state to determine mat-
ters of fact such as are usually determined by the jury
but simply to authorize the taking of a case from the jury
when the facts are so clearly established that the court
can see, as a matter of law, what the verdict and decision
should be."
r' Accord: State c. Juksch, 135 Wash. 682, 239 Pac. 207 (1925) Roe v.
Standard Furniture Co., 41 Wash. 546, 83 Pac. 1109 (1906) Brown v.
Walla Walla, 76 Wash. 670, 136 Pac. 1166 (1914) Washington Trust Co. v.
Kyes, 88 Wash. 287, 152 Pac. 1029 (1915)
52 21 Wash. 502. 58 Pac. 672. See also, Dunkle v. Spokane Falls & N. P
R. R. Co., 20 Wash. 254, 55 Pac. 51 (1898)
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Further,
" the state constitution declares the right of trial by
jury shall remain inviolate, and to take a case from the
jury when there are doubtful questions of fact to be deter-
mined, would be to deprive a non-assenting party of this
constitutional right. In the case at bar it was the prov-
ince of the jury whether the appellants were liable, and in
what sum if any, and the court should not have assumed to
determine these facts from the evidence presented."
There can be no doubt, then, from the cases examined, that the
rule appertaining in Washington is to the effect, that upon a
motion for a nonsuit, or directed verdict, as exercised at common
law, or a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence as provided
by statute,53 or on motion for judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict, the question raised is not one calling for a decision based on
the court's discretion after weighing the facts, but rather devolves
upon the court the plain duty of determining whether it shall take
the case from the jury and decide the case as a matter of law,
upon consideration of the evidence and all inferences reasonably
flowing therefrom. And such motions admit the truth of the
plaintiff's evidence, and all inferences that can reasonably be
drawn thereftom and the evidence mnust be construed most strong-
ly against the defendant. 4 In other words, such a motion cannot be
granted unless there is neither substantial evidence, nor reasonable
inference from evidence in support of the verdict, or possible
verdict.
Accordingly, then, a proponent (or defendant in case of affirm-
ative defense or counterclaim) who has made out a prima facie
case by evidence is entitled to have the issue submitted to a jury,
not withstanding an overwhelming preponderance of contradic-
tory evidence, and notwithstanding that a verdict in Ins favor
would have been set aside. Or quoting Judge Fullerton, in the
case of Henrickson v. Smith,55 decided in 1920
"By express provision of the constitution of the state,
and by the general laws, a litigant has the absolute right
to have disputed questions of fact submitted to the deter-
mmation of a jury The appellate court, as well as the
trial court, has power to see that such questions are prop-
"
3See note 15, supra.
Romano v. Short Lzne Stage Go., 142 Wash. 419, 253 Pac. 657 (1927)
Caughran v. Kahan, 86 Wash. 356, 150 Pac. 445 (1915) Harrts v. aunders,
108 Wash. 195, 182 Pac. 949 (1919).
1111 Wash. 82, 189 Pac. 550.
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erly submitted to the jury, and it is within the power of
the trial court to set aside a verdict which he is convinced
is contrary to the evidence, and submit the disputed ques-
tion to another jury But this is the limit of the power.
Judges of courts cannot without violation of the funda-
mental law substitute their opinions on disputed ques-
tions of fact, for the opinions of the juries and enter judg-
ment contrary to the verdicts of such juries."
And conversely, as stated by Judge Mount in the case of Leg-
horn v. Review Publishmng Co.,56 the general rule would seem to
be that (p. 632)
"Where there is no substantial conflict or dispute in evi-
dence and where the evidence is certain and incontrover-
tible, and but one conclusion can be reasonably drawn
therefrom the question then becomes a question for the
court and not for the jury 57
The test, then, is one of reasonableness. If reasonable minds
might reach contrary conclusions upon the evidence, the case can-
not be taken from the jury 58 If reasonable minds cannot differ as
to the conclusion to be drawn from the evidence, after giving the
most favorable construction to the evidence and all inferences
reasonably flowing therefrom, the case should be taken from the
jury 59
It seems plain that substantially the same test of reasonableness
is applied both for the purpose of directing a verdict and granting
5131 Wash. 621, 72 Pac. 485 (1903).
51 As to when verdict should be directed generally see: Clancy v. Reis,
5 Wash. '371, 31 Pac. 971 (1893) Wadhams v. Page, 6 Wash. 103, 32 Pac.
1068 (1893) (defendant admitted indebtedness, but failed to establish valid
defense) (no conflict in proofs) Underwood v. Stack, 15 Wash. 497, 46
Pac. 1031 (1896) 19 Wash. 108, 52 Pac. 526, (no disputed evidence on
material point) Pacific Natl. Bk. v. Aetna Life, 33 Wash. 428, 74 Pac. 590
(1903) (evidence for plaintiff clear and undisputed) Gray's Harbor
Boom Co. v. Lounsdale, 36 Wash. 198, 78 Pac. 904 (1904) (insufficiency
of evidence) Adams v. Peterman Mill Co., 74 W"ash. 484, 92 Pac. 339 (1913)
(establish cause of action) Jensen v. Williams, 72 Wash. 606, 131 Pac. 204
(1913) (no substantial evidence supporting material issues) Harris v.
Saunders, 108 Wash. 195, 182 Pac. 949 (1919)
When verdict should not be directed see, (disputed questions of fact)
Brookman. v. State Ins. Co., 18 Wash. 308, 51 Pac. 395 (1897) (doubtful
questions of facts) note 49, supra. (directed verdict refused where conflict
was slight) Menasa Wooden Ware Co. v. Nelson, 45 Wash. 543, 88 Pac.
1018 (1907).
Norrzs-Short Co. v. Everson Mercantile Company, 103 Wash. 399, 174
Pac. 645 (1918) Atwood v. Waslington Water Power Co., 79 Wash. 427,
140 Pac. 343 (1914).
59 Golay v. Northern Pac. Ry Co., 105 Wash. 132, 177 Pac. 804, 181 Pac.
700; Ramano v. Short Line Stage Co., 142 Wash. 419, 253 Pac. 657 (1927).
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a new trial, the difference being that in determining whether the
court may direct a verdict the test is applied only to that part of
the evidence favorable to proponent's case, whereas, in deternin-
mg whether a verdict may be set aside and a new trial granted,
the test is applied to all evidence,60 and further that in the first
case the court may not weigh evidence, whereas in the second case
it may, that is to say, in the first case the judge may not oppose
Ins opinion on the facts against that of the jury, but must deter-
mine whether all reasonable men can come to only one conclusion,
while in the second case he can give effect to his personal opinion
that the verdict is unreasonable, even though all men might not
agree with the judge in such opinion.
It is well settled law in this state that a verdict may be directed
for the proponent as well as against him."' True, a verdict will be
directed for the proponent only when there is uncontradicted tes-
tinony clearly establishing proponent's case. But it is submitted
that the real reason a verdict is directed in such a case is not
because the evidence is uncontradicted, but because it would be
unreasonable not to believe uncontradicted testimony If the
uncontradicted evidence happens to consist of testimony the truth
of which seems nprobable the circumstances would justify the
jury in not believing it, the courts would no doubt submit the
case to the jury on the question of credibility alone.
If, then, a verdict may be directed on the ground that it would
be unreasonable to disbelieve testimony, why should not a verdict
be directed if it be unreasonable to believe testimony' This is
exactly what the court does when it sets aside a verdict as against
the weight of the evidence. For, when a verdict is set aside as
against the weight of the evidence, the court is saying that it was
unreasonable for the jury to believe the proponent's evidence in
view of the overwhelming evidence on the other side.
The decision in the "Wezr case" 62 has definitely established in
the state the distinction that for the purpose of setting aside a ver-
dict the court may weigh the evidence, but for the purpose of
directing a verdict the court cannot weigh the evidence.
c" Clark v. G. . By., 37 Wash. 537, 79 Pac. 1108 (1905) Tacoma v.
Tacoma Light & Water, 16 Wash. 288, 47 Pac. 738 (1897), Shamec 'v.
Metropolitan Bldg. Co., 127 Wash. 336, 220 Pac. 816 (1923).
Clancy v. Rets (1893) note 57, supra, Sesszons v. Warwick, 46 Wash.
165, 89 Pac. 483 (1907) Wadhams v. Page, note 57, supra, Squires&'D.
Suinwalt, 6 Wash. 103, 32 Pac. 1068 (1895) Pacific Natl. Bank v. Aetna
Life, note 57, supra (1903).
61 Note 38, supra.
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From this rule some incongruity may result. For example, a
jury may render an unreasonable verdict against the weight of
the evidence, which the court promptly sets aside. A second jury
renders the same verdict under substantially the same testimony
The court, perhaps rather reluctantly, again sets it aside. A third
jury renders the same verdict. The court may again set it aside,
though actually after a third verdict the court generally yields.
Thus, the case is decided on the basis of endurance in a contest
between the jury and courtl
In the case of McCabe v. Lingberg,6 3 decided in 1918, just such
a question was presented to the court. There was an appeal from
an order granting a new trial upon the ground of insufficiency of
the evidence to sustain the verdict. It appears that this was the
second new trial granted on the same grounds, and it was con-
tended that since the evidence in both trials was substantially the
same, the trial judge was without power to enter the order now
complained of. In deciding that the power of the trial court to
grant a new trial for insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the
verdict is not limited or exhausted by granting one or more new
trials, Judge Morris, speaking for the court, and quoting with
approval from the case of Clark v. Jenkins, 162 Mass. 379, 38 N. E.
974, said
"In this commonwealth, there is no rule of law limit-
ing the number of times that a judge may set aside a ver-
dict as against the evidence. On the other hand, it has
been recognized that in an extraordinary case the court
may set aside any number of verdicts that might be re-
turned."
and further in the same opinion in discussing cases in New York
under a statute similar to our own (note 45, supra)
" the courts of that state (N. Y ) in cases where
such ruling appeared proper have set aside successive
verdicts as against the weight of the evidence, or sus-
tained the granting of two or more new trials upon the
ground of insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the ver-
dict."
In the case of Gnecco v. Pederson 65 judgment based upon a third
verdict was set aside and a new trial granted. And in another
99 Wash. 430, 169 Pac. 840. Accord: Thomas v. Hillis, 70 Wash. 54,
126 Pac. 62 (1912).
1" McCann v. N. Y & Q. C. By. Co., 73 App. Div. 305, 76 N. Y. Supp. 684
(1902) Merowitz v. MultotfskV, 134 N. Y. Supp. 588 (1912) Lacs v. James
Breweries, 107 App. Div. 250, 95 N. Y. Supp. 25 (1905) (latter case citing
many others.)
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New York case"6 it was said, after pointing out that as many as
three successive verdicts may and have been set aside
"The courts, however, recognize that where issues of
fact must be submitted to a jury, it becomes necessary for
the courts sooner or later to acquiesce in the verdict in
order that the litigation may come to an end, and that
the determination of the issues m a single action may not
occupy the attention of the courts to an unreasonable ex-
tent, and while there is no definite rule to that effect, it
may be said that the preponderance of judicial authority
is in favor of allowing the second verdict to stand. "
Thus a verdict which the court admittedly believes to be unrea-
sonable and therefore wrong, is sooner or later permitted to stand
in order to save the time of the courts.
To the rule that the court cannot decide ultimate questions of
fact m a jury trial, such questions being solely for the jury, there
is the one exception, that where both parties ask for a directed
verdict, they waive the verdict of the jury and submit the cause
for decision by the trial judge, who is then authorized to enter
such judgment as the evidence warrants.67 But it has been indi-
cated that even in such a case, the judge may still submit the cause
to the jury and that it becomes binding upon him to the same
extent as in other law cases.68
c. Power of Appellate Court with Respect. to the Sufficiency of
Evidence
The Supreme Court of Washington has no power to weigh
evidence and to grant new trials on the ground that the verdict
is against the weight of the evidence. Tins power resides solely
in the trial court. The appellate of this state can determine only
whether there is any substantial evidence (more than a mere
"scintilla") to support the verdict. If so, the verdict must be
allowed to stand, even, if the appellate court, if it had the power
to consider the evidence originally in place of the jury, nmght have
reached a contrary result.
-154 N. Y. Supp. 12 (1915).
Gutman, v. Vezsbarth, 194 App. Div. 351, 185 N. Y. 261 (1920).
Semer v. Hopkins, 101 Wash. 404, 172 Pac. 550 (1918).
"Peoples State Bank v. Drnsco l, 143 Wash. 461, 255 Pac. 134 (1927)
As to whether this rule applies to the statutory challenge to the suffi-
ciency of the evidence; see discussion and proposals of Revision Com-
mittee, referred to in note 15, supra.
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Thus, it is said in StrandelZ v. Moran .69
"True, the appellants say that there was no substantial
testimony contradicting their contention, but we find
against it the positive testimony of the respondent's
agent. Whether his testimony was true or false was for
the jury and trial judge to determine. This court has no
authority to weigh the eidence.
And in Brandt v. Northern Pacific R. Co.0 it is said
"That we, sitting as jurors, might have found other-
wise is no answer to the fact that there was substantial
evidence before the jury to the effect indicated. And
the jury having believed that evidence, rather than that
which contradicted it, we are powerless to interfere."
However, in the event that there is no substantial evidence to
support the verdict and the appellate court deems that a motion
for a nonsuit, directed verdict, challenge to the sufficiency of evi-
dence, or judgment notwithstanding the verdict has been improper-
ly denied, it will itself cause the proper order to be entered and
conclude the litigation.71
The foregoing rule, however, is not the rule in the federal courts.
The Supreme Court of the United States has ruled, construing
the seventh amendment, that upon determining that trial judge
has erred in refusing to direct a verdict, the appellate court can-
not enter a final judgment in favor of the party who was entitled
to a directed verdict, but can only remand the cause for a new
trial.72
STANLEY B. LONG.0
'49 Wash. 533, 95 Pac. 1106 (1908).
10 105 Wash. 138, 177 Pac. 806 (1919) and see cases cited Rem. Wash.
Dig. Title "Appeal & Error" see. 413.
' Woolf v. Washington R. & Nay. Co., 37 Wash. 491, 79 Pac. 997 (1905)
Golay v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 105 Wash. 132, 177 Pae. 807, 181 Pac. 700
(1919) Jones v. Harris, 122 Wash. 69, 210 Pac. 22 (1922).
-2 Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U. S. 364 (1913) Myers v.
Pittsburg Coal Co., 233 U. S. 184, 189 (1914) Fidelity Title Co. v. Dubois
Electric Co., 253 U. S. 212 (1920).
" Of the Seattle, Washington Bar.
